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2Abstract
We investigate the problem of nodes clustering under privacy constraints
when representing a dataset as a graph. Our contribution is threefold. First
we formally define the concept of differential privacy for structured databases
such as graphs, and give an alternative definition based on a new neighbor-
hood notion between graphs. This definition is adapted to particular frame-
works that can be met in various application fields such as genomics, world
wide web, population survey, etc. Second, we introduce a new algorithm to
tackle the issue of privately releasing an approximated minimum spanning
tree topology for a simple-undirected-weighted graph. It provides a simple
way of producing the topology of a private almost minimum spanning tree
which outperforms, in most cases, the state of the art "Laplace mechanism" in
terms of weight-approximation error. A thorough theoretical analysis of our
algorithm stressing the comparison between our bound and the state of the
art theoretical bound is presented. Given a simple-undirected-weighted graph
G = (V,E,w), our algorithm will always outperform the "Laplace mecha-
nism" when ∣E∣ ≥ 2(∣V ∣ − 1). To illustrate and support this result we also
perform some experiments comparing the two methods based on simulated
graphs.
Finally, we propose a theoretically motivated method combining a sanitizing
mechanism (such as Laplace or our new algorithm) with a Minimum Spanning
Tree (MST)-based clustering algorithm. It provides an accurate method for
nodes clustering in a graph while keeping the sensitive information contained
in the edges weights of the private graph. We provide some theoretical re-
sults on the robustness of an almost minimum spanning tree construction for
Laplace sanitizing mechanisms. These results exhibit which conditions the
graph weights should respect in order to consider that the nodes form well
separated clusters both for Laplace and our algorithm as sanitizing mecha-
nism. The method has been experimentally evaluated on simulated data, and
preliminary results show the good behavior of the algorithm while identifying
well separated clusters.
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Introduction
Graphs represent a useful representation for many types of data, widely used in e.g. bioin-
formatics, network analysis, etc. More broadly, any dataset can be converted into a graph
by using a well-chosen similarity matrix construction. In that respect, graph cluster-
ing [Sch07] appears to be a key tool for understanding the underlying structure of many
data sets by locating nodes groups ruled by a specific similarity.
A primary issue to be tackled while using machine learning techniques on a dataset
is to protect the private characteristics of the individuals belonging to this dataset. Pro-
tecting the privacy of individuals while producing statistical analysis is an old topic which
foundations have mostly been laid in the 1980’s by Goldwasser and al., Denning or Adam
and al. in [GM84, Den80, AW89]. A very famous example of massive security breach due
to data-analysis, "the Netflix Prize contest" [NS08] brought this concern back in light
by showing that it is possible to obtain a robust de-anonymization of a database by cross
correlating the anonymized database with some other open source datasets. Following this,
recent studies including [FLJ+14] and [FJR15] revealed that our classical methods for
data analysis are vulnerable to reconstruction attacks. It means that, given some statistics
about a dataset, an adversarial machine learning algorithm can obtain with high proba-
bility personal characteristics from the individuals in the dataset. This might raise serious
issues in medical applications for instance [FLJ+14]. Those concerns are real, and several
definitions and applications of what privacy should mean and be used for have been intro-
duced. For a complete survey on the definitions of Privacy-preserving data publishing one
could refer to [FWCY10]. The widely adopted definition of what a "good" privacy condi-
tion should be is called "differential privacy". Since this seminal work [DMNS06], several
models respecting the differential privacy conditions have been proposed (e.g. [JLE14]),
but most of them do not consider structured types of data such as graphs. Therefore, how
to consider differential privacy on structured data types remains an open question. Should
one keep private the nodes, the edges and/or the weights of the graph. Those choices are
mainly made according to the nature of the data at hand.
This work aims at investigating formal frameworks for preserving privacy in learning
from graph-structured data. The overall goal is to pave the way for clustering applications
in genomics, proteomics, web monitoring, etc. where privacy-preserving is not an option
but a strong requirement. In the sequel, after introducing what one should understand by
differential privacy on structured databases, we will focus on providing new ways to analyze
those datasets while preserving privacy in the process. Chapters 1 and 2 provide intro-
ductions to differential privacy and differential privacy on structured datasets. Chapter 3
presents our contribution to the theory of differential privacy as well as a new algorithm
for the release of a minimum spanning tree under privacy conditions and compare it to the
state of the art for releasing such a statistic. Finally, Chapter 4 introduces our contribution
to differentially private clustering while presenting our first advances on MST-based differ-
entially private clustering. Since this work does not recall the foundations of graph theory,
we recommend reading appendix A.1 to ensure the readability of the following report.
5

Chapter 1
An introduction to differential
privacy
Chapter 1 aims at providing a simple but efficient introduction to the notions and prelim-
inaries of differential privacy. They will first be presented in an intuitive way, and further
formally stated. Some classical results will also be presented. To conclude this chapter we
introduce the Exponential mechanism which is the cornerstone of the differentially private
analysis for structured databases.
1.1 Differential privacy Framework
Figure 1.1: The Sanitizing Pipe Dream
The Framework for differential privacy inherits from a long history of formalizing pri-
vacy concerns which here, for simplicity, is summed up to two settings presentation includ-
ing the ideal framework and the actually used one. The first assumption in the differential
privacy framework is that an agent, called curator holds the database. This curator is trust-
worthy (will not leak the database), and has sufficient (unlimited) computational power
to protect the database from being hacked. Moreover, the database is in a safe place and
can not be physically stolen. Those assumptions essentially allows one to consider that the
only way to have access to the database is through the curator. Therefore, an adversar-
ial analyst can only infer information about the individual in the database by statistical
reconstruction, based on the information released by the curator. Finally to cover a wide
range of settings, one can consider the adversarial analyst to have unlimited computational
power and unlimited knowledge (i.e apart from what he/she is trying to infer, he/she has
access to any kind of additional databases).
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Figure 1.2: Actual framework for differentially private query answering
Figure 1.1 represents the ideal version of privacy preserving data analysis as first pre-
sented by Cynthia Dwork [DR13]. In this so called "Sanitizing Pipe dream", the curator
can released a new database that could hypothetically accurately answer any kind of query
without leaking any private information about the database. Of course, and as Claim 1.4.1
will formalize it later, this version is not applicable while preserving differential privacy. In
practice, as illustrated by Figure 1.2, the analyst only has query access to the curator and
get sanitized response instead of real query answers. In the remaining of this report, every
mechanism presented to ensure differential privacy is applied by the curator to answer the
corresponding query asked by the analyst. Section 1.2 aims at giving a good intuition of
why the curator is crucial to keep the sensitive information in the database private.
1.2 How should one understand differential privacy
First introduced by Dwork and al. in [DMNS06], differential privacy is a robust and rig-
orously defined notion that provides formal but adaptive conception of privacy preserving
data-analysis, but let us first give an intuitive understanding of it. The main idea in con-
ceiving such a privacy is that any individual information is protected if "the outcome of
any analysis is essentially equally likely, independent of whether any individuals joins, or
refrains from joining the database". Let us clarify this statement with some examples.
Example 1.2.1 (Differencing attack). Assume some adversarial analyst has a query access
to a medical record database containing the French President’s record without any curator
being set. He/she wants to know if the president has some specific medical condition, let it
be a heart disease, but he/she is only allowed to produce some statistical analysis, e.g the
frequency of this condition in the database (only has query access to the database). Since,
given a database, the analysis outcome is deterministic (frequency), any outcome will not
be essentially equally likely to occur if one individual refrains from joining the database.
The differencing attack (cf. Figure 1.3) uses this flaw to infer some extremely sensitive
information about Mr President.
As illustrated by figure 1.3 differencing attack consists in producing the analysis, first
on the initial database containing the president, and second on the same database without
the president being in the studied population. Assuming the analyst knows the size of the
database, the output variation between the two analysis gives with perfect certainty the
medical condition of the French President.
Example 1.2.1 highlights the fact that any deterministic analysis of a dataset represents
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Figure 1.3: Inferring the French President medical condition while asking the same query
on two adversarial chosen databases
a security breach, this is why the curator is needed to input some kind of randomness that
will help preserving privacy. However, it does not mean that any statistical analysis is
prohibited, it only means that perfect accuracy breaks privacy. Example 1.2.2 represents a
toy setting where an analyst can produce a useful statistical analysis on a given population
with no privacy breach on any individual.
Example 1.2.2. Let us suppose any analyst wants to know how much eyes does the average
American have. Given a representative dataset for the American population, any simple
analysis will give with high probability that the average American has two eyes. Let us now
suppose that an individual, named John Doe, was part of the dataset used for this analysis.
Was the analysis a security breach of John Doe’s information according to differential
privacy? No, it was not! In fact, whether John participates or not to that kind of study
will not significantly change it outcomes (the average American will have two eyes either
way), and that is what differential privacy is about. Therefore the analyst just produced a
useful analysis allowing him/her to learn about the American population without breaking
the private information of John Doe.
Remark 1.2.1. This definition of privacy is not too permissive since considering Exam-
ple 1.2.2 as a privacy breach rules out any statistical analysis of a dataset.
Section 1.3 provides a formal definition of differential privacy. This definition is closely
related to the notion of randomness to ensure statistical indistinguishableness of the anal-
ysis outcomes. Statistical indistinguishableness also refers to one of the most important
notion in differential privacy, the neighborhood notion.
1.3 Randomness and Neighboring
To provide a formal definition of differential privacy, one should first better introduce the
notions of randomness, and neighborhood. Randomness is essential because determinis-
tic algorithms represents privacy breaches as illustrated by Example 1.2.1. It should be
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more convenient to preserve some kind of accuracy and ensure the statistical indistinguish-
ableness of the outcomes. Moreover, giving a good definition of two statistically similar
outcomes is not trivial. Intuitively, two outcomes are statistically close if they are com-
puted on the same kind of databases, and if they are close in the output space. This is why
one also needs to well introduce the notion of neighboring between databases and between
output distributions.
Definition 1.3.1 (Randomized Algorithm). Given a probability space (Ω,F ,P), and a
measurable set B, a randomized algorithm A with domain D and range B is a function
that takes an input d ∈D, and outputs a random variable (denoted A(d)) with values in B.
We will always consider for the remaining of this work the underlying probability space(Ω,F ,P), denote Range(A) the output space B, and omit to identify it when the setting is
clear enough. Moreover we simplify the database notation. One should think of a database
x as being collections of records from a universe X . For convenience, databases will often
be represented by their histograms: x ∈ N∣X ∣, in which (by notation-abuse) for all i ∈ X , xi
represents the number of elements of type i in x. In this representation, a natural measure
of the distance between two databases x and y will be their `1 distance:
Definition 1.3.2 (Distance between two databases). The `1 norm of a database x is
denoted ∣∣x∣∣1 and defined to be: ∣∣x∣∣1 = ∣X ∣∑
i=1 ∣xi∣
The l1 distance between two databases x and y is ∣∣x − y∣∣1. Moreover we call neighboring
databases any x, y ∈ N∣X ∣ such that ∣∣x − y∣∣1 ≤ 1 (denoted x ∼ y).
The neighborhood notion between databases is set, let us now give such a notion for
the output distributions. It is based on the well known Kullback-Leibler divergence.
Definition 1.3.3 (Kullback-Leibler Divergence). The Kullback-Leibler Divergence, or rel-
ative entropy, between two random variables Y and Z taking values from the same domain
is defined to be :
D (Y ∣∣Z) = Ey∼Y [ln P(Y = y)P(Z = y)] .
The Kullback-Leibler divergence is not a distance since it does not respect the triangle
inequality and is not symmetric, however, it provides a good intuition of one-sided neigh-
borhood for statistical distributions. Definition 1.3.4 is a generalization of the Kullback-
Leibler Divergence which is closely related to the definition of differential privacy as stated
in proposition 1.3.1.
Definition 1.3.4 (Max Divergence). The Max divergence between two random variables
Y and Z taking values from the same domain is defined to be:
D∞ (Y ∣∣Z) = sup
S⊂Supp(Y ) [ln P(Y ∈ S)P(Z ∈ S)] .
The δ-Approximate Max divergence between Y and Z is defined to be
Dδ∞ (Y ∣∣Z) = sup
S⊂Supp(Y ) and P(Y ∈S)>δ [ln P(Y ∈ S) − δP(Z ∈ S) ] .
Let us now introduce the formal definition of differential privacy, and demonstrate how
δ-Approximate Max divergence and differential privacy notions overlap.
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Definition 1.3.5 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm A with domain N∣X ∣ is
called (, δ)-differentially private if for any S ⊂ Range(A) and for all x, y ∈ N∣X ∣ such that∣∣x − y∣∣1 ≤ 1:
P [A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eP [A(y) ∈ S] + δ
If δ = 0, A is said to be -differentially private.
This formal definition provides a guarantee that under a reasonable choice of the privacy
degree , two close databases in term of `1 norm will produce statistically inseparable
results. It is also a symmetrical rewriting of δ-Approximate Max divergence.
Proposition 1.3.1 (Privacy by Kullback-Leibler Divergence). A randomized algorithm A
is (, δ)-differentially private if and only if for all x, y ∈ N∣X ∣ such that x ∼ y, Dδ∞(A(x)∣∣A(y)) ≤
 and Dδ∞(A(y)∣∣A(x)) ≤ 
Proof 1.3.1 (Sketch of proof). Let A be (, δ)-differentially private randomized algorithm.
Let S ⊂ Range(A) and x ∼ y ∈ N∣X ∣, the proof comes down to this equivalence
P[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eP[A(y) ∈ S] + δ ⇐⇒ P[A(x) ∈ S] − δ ≤ eP[A(y) ∈ S]
⇐⇒ ln P[A(x) ∈ S] − δ
P[A(y) ∈ S] ≤ 
for all S such that P[A(x) ∈ S] > δ, P[A(y) ∈ S] > 0 . ∎
Remark 1.3.1. For a full proof one can refer to appendix A.2.
The definition of differential privacy is actually a characterization of a privacy preserv-
ing algorithm, it is thus a property some mechanisms should help preserving. Section 1.4
provides some of the most famous and used mechanisms that aim at sanitizing a statistical
analysis without degrading too much its accuracy.
1.4 Classical results
Section 1.4 introduces the most classical results about differential privacy, namely: the
Laplace mechanism, the Gaussian mechanism and the composition theorems.
Let us consider that a numeric query is a deterministic function f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk. This
kind of queries maps a database to a k-dimensional real vector. In the sequel we will
denote numerical query as query, and specify only when it is not numerical. One of the
most important notion in differential privacy to measure the accuracy of such queries is
their sensitivity. The very first work by Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith [DMNS06]
on differential privacy introduces the idea that the sensitivity of a query is the measure
of how much, in the worst case, a single individual’s data can change the answer to the
query. In their [NRS07], Nissim and al. give an extended theoretical study on queries
sensitivity and its link to elaborating differentially private mechanisms. Since then, most
of differential privacy studies rely on this notion.
Definition 1.4.1 (`p sensitivity). For any p ∈ N, and f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk, the `p sensitivity of f
is:
∆p(f) ∶= sup
x,y∈N∣X ∣,x∼y ∣∣f(x) − f(y)∣∣p
i.e the maximum `p-distance between the outcomes of any two neighboring databases.
This definition is mostly used in its `1 and `2 form, one can respectively use those
definitions to present the Laplace and Gaussian mechanism.
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Definition 1.4.2 (Laplace Mechanism). Given any function f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk, and  > 0, the
Laplace mechanism is defined as
ML(x, f, ) = f(x) + (Y1, ..., Yk)
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap (∆1(f)/).
Where Lap(b) denote the Laplace distribution with scale b that is the distribution with
probability density Lap(x∣b) = 12bexp (− ∣x∣b ).
Definition 1.4.3 (Gaussian Mechanism). Given any function f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk, and 0 <  < 1,
the Gaussian mechanism is defined as
MG (x, f, , δ) = f(x) + (Y1, ..., Yk)
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from N (0, c∆2(f)/), with c2 > 2 ln(1.25/δ).
Remark 1.4.1. Those mechanism transform a deterministic query (f) into a randomized
algorithm (A) by adding random variables to the deterministic query.
Given a privacy degree (, δ), this two mechanisms respectively allow to release the
answer to any numerical query while ensuring -differential privacy and (, δ)-differential
privacy. For a complete theoretical analysis of the two mechanisms we refer the reader
to [DR13, Chapter 3] and [NRS07].
The main issue while dealing with private algorithm design is the trade-off between
privacy and accuracy. In fact, it is quite logical to think that the more accurate the
queries’ answers are, the more information one gets about the database, and therefore, the
more privacy is degraded.
Claim 1.4.1 ([DR13] The Fundamental Law of Information Recovery). "Overly accurate
answers to too many questions will destroy privacy in a spectacular way"
This statement is a simple reformulation of the theoretical works about reconstructions
attacks against private databases [DR13, chapter 8] and [DN03]. It simply states that
accuracy and privacy are not trivially combined. To have a better understanding of what
this trade-off is about, let us present the main result on the accuracy of the Laplace
mechanism.
Theorem 1.4.1 ([DMNS06] Accuracy of the Laplace mechanism). Let f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk,
x ∈ N∣X ∣, and  > 0. Moreover let y =ML(x, f, ). Then ∀γ ∈ (0,1] :
P [∣∣f(x) − y∣∣∞ ≥ ∆1(f)

ln
k
γ
] ≤ γ, k being the dimensionality of the output space.
Seeing this theorem, it is quite straightforward that the accuracy is non-increasing re-
garding . Therefore a strong privacy implies less accurate outcomes and vice versa. The
accuracy/privacy tradeoff is a central issue that have to be tackled for any new differentially
private method, and this will be an important concern for the introduction of our contri-
bution in Chapter 3. However, now that one is more familiar with the basic constructions
let us introduce the main tool to construct complex differentially private mechanisms: the
composition.
The main strength of differential privacy is its ability to compose, i.e to construct a
complex differentially private mechanism from several simple ones. So far we presented a
definition of differential privacy and two of the simplest ways to construct a differentially
private mechanism, let us now introduce how to compose such simple blocks.
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Proposition 1.4.1 (e.g [DR13] Post-Processing). Let A be a (, δ)-differentially private
randomized algorithm with domain N∣X ∣ and range B, and h ∶ B → B′ a deterministic
(measurable) mapping. Then h ○A is (, δ)-differentially private.
This proposition is clearly a strong result that allows one to compute a one-time-only
release of the private mechanism for any other deterministic algorithm to be performed.
One can also compose several (, δ)-differentially private mechanisms according to the
following propositions.
Proposition 1.4.2 ([DR13] Simple Composition). Let k ∈ N and (Ai)i∈[k] such that for
all i ∈ [k],Ai is an (i, δi)-differentially private algorithm with domain N∣X ∣, and range Bi.
Then A[k] is an (∑ki=1 i,∑ki=1 δi)-differentially private algorithm with range ∏
i∈[k]Bi, where∀x ∈ N∣X ∣, A[k](x) = (Ai(x))i∈[k].
Proposition 1.4.3 ([DKM+06] Adaptive Composition). For any , δ ≥ 0 the adaptive
composition of k (, δ)-differentially private mechanisms is (k, kδ)-differentially private.
Once more, one must recall that composition is easy but degrade either the accuracy
or the privacy of the resulting mechanism according to Claim 1.4.1, it should thus be used
cautiously. The main keys for differentially private analysis on numerical databases being
set, let us now introduce the basics of the differentially private analysis on structured
databases.
1.5 The Exponential mechanism
First introduced by McSherry and Talwar in [MT07], the Exponential mechanism is the
typical way of answering arbitrary range queries while preserving differential privacy. It
was designed for the situations were simply adding noise to the computed quantity is
rather impossible (non-numeric data) or would destroy the complete data structure (in
game theory slightly modifying the strategy can make the outcome drop from optimal to
null [FT91]). Given some range R of possible responses to a query, it is defined according
to a utility function u ∶= N∣X ∣ ×R→ R. Intuitively, it does not need to be a utility function
in terms of game theory, but it aims at providing some total preorder on the range R
according to the total order of R. The sensitivity of this function is denoted
∆u = max
r∈R maxx∼y∈N∣X ∣ ∣u(x, r) − u(y, r)∣.
Definition 1.5.1 (Exponential mechanism). Given some output range R, a privacy pa-
rameter  > 0, an utility function u ∶= N∣X ∣ ×R → R, and some x ∈ N∣X ∣, the exponential
mechanism MExp(x,u,R, ) selects and outputs an element r ∈R with probability propor-
tional to exp ( u(x,r)2∆u ).
The exponential mechanism defines a distribution on a potentially complex and large
range R. As the following proposition states, sampling from such a distribution preserves
-differential privacy.
Proposition 1.5.1 ([MT07] Privacy of the Exponential mechanism). For any non empty
range R, the exponential mechanism preserves -differential privacy, i.e. if x ∼ y ∈ N∣X ∣,
P [MExp(x,u,R, ) = r] ≤ eP [MExp(y, u,R, ) = r] .
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As stated in section 1.4, every private mechanism has to achieve a trade-off between
privacy and accuracy of the method. The exponential mechanism does not constitute an
exception to this rule. The following proposition highlights this trade-off for the exponential
mechanism when ∣R∣ < +∞.
Proposition 1.5.2 (reformulation [DR13] Accuracy of the Exponential mechanism). Given
some dataset x ∈ N∣X ∣, a non empty output range R, a privacy parameter  > 0, a utility
function u ∶= N∣X ∣ ×R→ R, and denoting OPTu(x) = max
r∈R u(x, r), then for all t ∈ R
P [u(x,MExp(x,u,R, )) ≤ OPTu(x) − 2∆u

(ln (∣R∣) + t)] ≤ e−t.
The exponential mechanism opens up the field of possibilities about what differential
privacy on structured databases could be. Chapter 2 focuses on investigating differential
privacy on graph databases, and presents the privacy type we have chosen to introduce in
the remaining of this work.
Chapter 2
Differential privacy for graph
databases
The neighborhood notion between two databases is the central notion of the definition of
differential privacy, therefore, as soon as one gives a notion of neighboring between two
(structured or unstructured) databases, one can construct differentially private mechanisms
to protect the sensitive information within those databases. Accordingly, how to consider
differential privacy on structured databases has become a fundamental question, due to
the diversity and complexity of the attributes one could want to keep private. Mir and
al. in [MW09] as well as Karwa and al. in [KRSY11] formalized the idea of releasing
statistics on a graph in a differentially private manner following the seminal work of Nissim
and al. in [NRS07]. Furthermore the community focused on how to sanitize the graph,
therefore several definitions of neighboring and privacy on graphs appeared. Chapter 2
focuses on introducing the different definitions of differential privacy for graph stressing
the presentation of weight-differential privacy which will be used in the remaining of this
work.
2.1 Edge and node differential privacy
The two common ways of conceiving privacy on a graph topology are edge-differential
privacy [HLMJ09], and node-differential privacy [KNRS13]. Both are strongly connected
to the analysis of social networks. Under edge-differential privacy, two graph topologies
are neighbors if one of them can be obtained from the other by adding or removing a
single edge. This kind of neighborhood notion, and the privacy definition that follows
could formalize the hiding of a friendship relation between to individuals as illustrated
by Figure 2.1. This figure also presents the link between the intuition and the formal
definition of edge-neighboring graph topologies based on the Hamming distance between
the edge sets.
Definition 2.1.1 (Edge-neighboring graph topologies). Two graph topologies G1 = (V1,E1)
and G2 = (V2,E2), are said to be edge-neighboring, denoted G1 ∼
edge
G2 if
min
σ∈Perm(E)dH [σ(E1), σ(E2)] ≤ 1,
i.e if the minimum Hamming distance between any two permutation σ of their edge sets is
lower or equal to one.
Remark 2.1.1. For simplicity one could denote dH(E1,E2) = min
σ∈Perm(E)dH [σ(E1), σ(E2)]
making the assumption that the edge sets are "well ordered" (as in Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: Evaluation of the neighboring between social networks based on the Hamming
distance between the link sets.
For node-differential privacy, two graphs are said to be neighbors if one can be obtained
from the other by removing a single node and all its incident edges. This could formalize
the presence of an individual in a social network as Figure 2.2 illustrates.
Figure 2.2: Two node-neighboring social networks with strongly differing topologies
This neighborhood notion is a more permissive than the previous one, since it allows
two highly different topologies to be neighboring as illustrated in Figure 2.2. The for-
mal definition of node differential privacy is also constructed according to the Hamming
distance, but between the node sets. Although edge and node differential privacies are
widely used on structured databases, both of them are close to social network analysis,
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and thus focused on the graph topologies. The privacy choices are mainly made according
to the nature of the data at hand, and many real life situations such as flow monitoring
in energy-supply networks or transport networks analysis can be represented by weighted
graphs with fixed topology and evolving weights. Section 2.2 presents a new definition of
privacy for such structured databases where edge or node privacy are not applicable.
2.2 Weight-differential privacy
The idea of weight-differential privacy seems to first appear in an implementation paper by
Costea and al. [CBR13] , but theoretical foundations for considering weight-differential pri-
vacy on a graph has been recently introduced by Adam Sealfon in [Sea16]. The emergence
of this new notion is related to the existence of some settings (e.g transport networks) in
which the structure of the database is intrinsic to the problem but fixed, and a lot of the
information is carried by the edge weights. In such settings the privacy breach will occur
on the edge weights, therefore edge or node-differential privacy are not applicable, and
this is how weight-differential privacy emerged. Example 2.2.1 aims at providing a good
intuition of the settings where the information carried by the weights has to be protected.
Example 2.2.1. An analyst wants to produce a study of the traffic within a subgraph
of the World Wide Web. In this setting, the flow between two websites is the number
of users passing from one to the other using an existing hyper-link. A simplified version
of this problem can be formalized by the simple-undirected-weighted graph G = (V,E,w),
where all nodes are websites and the edges are the existing hyper-links between them. The
weight function w ∶= E → R+ returns for any edge, given a chosen population, the number
of individuals passing, one way or the other, through the corresponding hyper-link in the
world wide web network.
Figure 2.3: A subgraph of the World Wide Web weighted by the individual passing via an
hyper-link from one site to the other. Red path highlights one individual behavior.
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What kind of privacy breach could occur? For the purpose of the example, let
us suppose that in Figure 2.3, Website 3 is a high sensitive website (political, or sexual
orientation related for example). The analyst needs to have some statistics about this
website attendance, for example the value of the incident hyper-link on which the traffic is
the highest, but he is not supposed to be able to indicate whether some particular individual
is related to this website or not, given the sensitive aspect of such an information. However,
in absence of a curator applying some mechanism ensuring privacy, if he chooses to produce
a differencing attack on the red individual in the graph given the statistic "what is the value
of highest weighted incident edge" he will infer the personal behavior of the red individual
concerning Website 3.
Motivated by similar settings, Adam Sealfon gives the formal definition of weight-
differential privacy in [Sea16]. He has also introduced algorithms and theoretical bounds
for the release of distances, paths, matchings, and spanning trees under privacy constraints.
The rest of Chapter 2 is dedicated to presenting the main definitions and the privacy mech-
anism he introduced, whereas Chapter 3 presents, among other things, his result on the
release of an approximated minimum spanning tree.
Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph with a vertex set V , an edge set E, and a
weight function w ∶= E → R mapping any edge in E to its weight in the graph. Since
weight-differential privacy is not a topological based privacy definition, the neighborhood
notion is mostly related to the weights.
Definition 2.2.1 (`1-neighboring between weight functions). For any edge set E, two
weight functions w,w′ ∈WE are neighboring, denoted w ∼ w′, if
∣∣w −w′∣∣1 ∶= ∑
e∈E ∣w(e) −w′(e)∣ ≤ 1.
Section 3.3 presents our contribution and reformulation of this definition, this is why,
for clarity of the remaining of this work we call this neighboring `1-neighboring, denoted
w ∼`
1
w′.
Definition 2.2.2 (`1-weight-neighboring graphs). Let G = (V,E,w) and G′ = (V ′,E′,w′),
two weighted graphs, G and G′ are said to be `1-weight neighboring if V = V ′, E = E′ and
w ∼`
1
w′.
Now, let one formally define weight-differential privacy for graph algorithms according
to the above notions.
Definition 2.2.3 (`1-weight-differential privacy). For any graph topology G = (V,E), letA be a randomized algorithm that takes as input a weight function w ∈ WE. A is called(, δ)-`1-weight-differentially private on G = (V,E) if for all pairs of `1-neighboring weight
functions w,w′ ∈WE, and for all set of possible outputs S, one has
P [A(w) ∈ S] ≤ eP [A(w′) ∈ S] + δ
If A is (, δ)-differentially private on every graph topology in a class C, it can be denoted
as (, δ)-differentially private on C.
Weight-differential privacy is a very new research field. For now the privacy of most
graph statistics [Sea16, BCGO16b, BCGO16a] are based on a sanitizing of the graph using
a pre-processing. This means that a generic mechanism is used to ensure weight-privacy
of all the graph weights before using a post-processing (Proposition 1.4.1) to compute any
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other statistic. Those generic mechanisms are immediate applications of the Gaussian or
Laplace mechanism as defined in Section 1.4. More precisely weight-differential privacy
is ensured by using the simple idea of adding identically distributed random noise drawn
from a Laplace/Gaussian distribution on every edge weight.
Definition 2.2.4 (Graph-based Laplace mechanism). Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted
graph, and  > 0 a privacy parameter. Graph-based Laplace mechanism is defined as
MGbL(G, ) = G′ = (V,E,w′ = w + (Y1, ..., Y∣E∣))
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap (1/). With w+(Y1, ..., Y∣E∣) meaning
that if one gives an arbitrary order to the edges E = (ei)i∈[∣E∣], one has w′(ei) = w(ei) + Yi∀i ∈ [∣E∣].
Remark 2.2.1. This graph based mechanism is a direct application of the Laplace mech-
anism from Section 1.4 considering that the numerical query f is the releasing of all the
arbitrarily ordered weights. Therefore, the method inherits all the properties from Sec-
tion 1.4 about the privacy and accuracy of the Laplace mechanism.
Remark 2.2.2. The analog analysis is available for the Gaussian mechanism in [BCGO16b,
BCGO16a] with a fine analysis of the block-structured sensitivity of the graph.
The generic mechanisms allow one to release a noisy version of the initial graph, which
will make any post-processing -differentially private. They are useful, but since the infor-
mation release is massive (every graph weight is released with the graph structure), the total
amount of noise needed to keep the graph private is huge. As claimed in Section 1.4, such
a generic sanitizing mechanism cannot ensure close theoretical and experimental bound on
every statistics an analyst could need. Chapter 3 presents, based on the minimum span-
ning tree statistic, how one can choose to privately construct a selected statistic instead of
sanitizing the whole graph and computing this statistic as a post processing.

Chapter 3
Private Minimum Spanning Tree
In this chapter, we firstly present the main result on releasing the minimum spanning tree
in a weighted graph under privacy constraints, and secondly introduces a new algorithm to
tackle the issue of privately releasing an approximated minimum spanning tree topology
for a simple-undirected-weighted graph. Stressing the theoretical and experimental com-
parison between the Post-processing method (Laplace mechanism) and the In-processing
one (new algorithm) highlights the fact that In-processing, while being less generic, obtains
better results and ensures the same privacy guarantees for this specific task.
3.1 In-processing versus Post-processing
According to the framework of differential privacy, the analyst only has a query access to the
database. The main difference between the In-processing access and the Post-processing
one is the nature of the query.
Figure 3.1: Comparison of in processing and post processing methods for the computation
of a private minimum spanning tree (MST).
As illustrated by Figure 3.1, in a Post-processing method, the analyst asks one time
for all the weights, and obtains a noisy version of them. Then he/she produces any deter-
ministic treatment he/she likes (here a minimum spanning tree) given that the privacy is
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guaranteed on the weight release itself (Proposition 1.4.1). In the In-processing method,
the analyst directly asks the curator to produce a private version of the statistic he/she
wants, and thus allows the curator to adapt the randomized construction to ensure the
same privacy with better accuracy. The intuitive idea that supports the In-processing
methods is that releasing a synthetic version of the database (here a minimum spanning
tree) contains less information than releasing the whole database and thus sanitizing it is
less costful in terms of accuracy. The remaining of this chapter presents a Post-processing
and an In-processing method for the releasing of a minimum spanning tree topology and
compare theoretically and experimentally their accuracies.
3.2 Approximated Minimum Spanning Tree by
Graph-based Laplace mechanism
While Nissim, Rakhodnika and Smith [NRS07] only managed to privately compute the
approximated cost of a minimum spanning tree, Sealfon [Sea16], by using the Graph-based
Laplace mechanism, manages to release a true weighted tree under -weight-differential
privacy. His method is quite simple and amounts to use the Laplace mechanism to sanitize
all the graph weights before computing a deterministic MST algorithm on the new graph.
He claims the topology of the minimum spanning tree obtained on the sanitized graph to be
almost minimal weight if it is evaluated with the real weights (non sanitized weights). To
evaluate the accuracy of his method, he compares the weight of a minimum spanning tree
in the initial graph (before Laplace mechanism) with the weight (using the non sanitized
weight function) of the tree-topology that minimizes the total noisy-weight (the topology
of the MST in the sanitized graph). Definition 3.2.1 should clarify and formalize this error
evaluation.
Definition 3.2.1 (Approximation Error for Approximated Minimum Spanning Tree). Let
G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph,  > 0, T the topology of the minimum spanning tree of
G and T ′ the topology of an approximated minimum spanning tree obtained by an arbitrary
randomized algorithm. Since T and T ′ can be characterized by two edge subsets of E :T = (ei)i∈[∣V ∣−1] and T ′ = (e′i)i∈[∣V ∣−1], the error of the spanning tree topology T ′ for the
approximation of the minimum spanning tree topology of G is
ErrorG (T ′) = ∑
i∈[∣V ∣−1]w(e′i) − ∑i∈[∣V ∣−1]w(ei).
Remark 3.2.1. For simplicity one can write the total weight of a spanning tree T as
w(T ).
Using Definition 3.2.1, we reformulate, for the sake of clarity, in the following theorem,
the theoretical worst case guarantee on the error of an approximated minimum spanning
tree topology produced by Sealfon’s method [Sea16] (Graph-based Laplace mechanism +
deterministic MST algorithm).
Theorem 3.2.1 ([Sea16] Error of a Graph-based Laplace mechanism AMST). For any
 > 0, γ ∈ (0,1], G = (V,E,w), and T ′ the topology of a minimum spanning tree on G′ =MGbL(G, ), one has
P [ErrorG (T ′) ≥ 2(∣V ∣ − 1)

ln
∣E∣
γ
] ≤ γ.
This theorem evaluates the accuracy of the topology of the minimum spanning tree on
G′ given the weight of the same topology in G. Since this error definition does not depend
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on the mechanism used to produce the approximated minimum spanning tree topology, we
also use it to evaluate the error the In-processing algorithm makes. The following section
details our contribution to the theory of weight-differential privacy, compares the theoret-
ical bound obtained with the bound in Theorem 3.2.1, and produces some experiments to
support this comparison.
3.3 A new privacy setting
The model for privacy presented in this section is similar to the one in [Sea16], given that
the same definition of differential privacy is used. Nevertheless the neighborhood definition
used to compare two graphs relies on the `∞ distance between the weight function outputs,
while the previous model imposed the whole graph changes to sum to 1 inducing a neigh-
borhood notion based on the `1 distance. The mechanism and definitions presented are a
straightforward applications of the preliminaries from Chapter 1, they thus inherit all the
proprieties introduced in this chapter. First, to fully understand the need to introduce such
a new definition, one must present the framework from which the idea of a new definition
emerged.
Graph sketching Framework: Let us consider the new general framework that could
be the formal vision of Example 2.2.1 as well as individuals answering a survey by yes or
no questions as illustrated by Figure 3.2
One has a dataset of vectors (zi)i∈[N], where zi ∈ {0,1}M (we denote the jth element of the
vector zi by z
j
i ). One does not need to assume anything about the size of N and M else
than N > M . To efficiently represent this database for a correlation analysis, one could
want to sketch it into a graph. Such a graph could be as follows:
G = (V,E,w) with V = {1, ...M} (one node per variable), E is the set of couples of
variables for which the analyst want to observe the correlation, and finally the weight
function is characterized by w ((i, j)) = #{k ∈ [N] s.t. zjk = zik = 1} for every (i, j) ∈ E
(here we consider counting edges but one can choose to adapt those weights to the partial
correlation or any other similarity, it might change the sensitivity of the method but our
method can scale up according to the sensitivity of the framework).
In such a setting, the sensitive information is carried by every individual zi, therefore,
to protect the individuals, privacy should be respected on the edges’ weights. Nevertheless,
using the definition from [Sea16] would be too costful in terms of accuracy since it adds
noise scaled toM to every edges (in fact, the change of one individual in the database could
change the `1 distance between weight function by at most M), potentially destroying the
whole weight structure of the graph. In such settings, we give a new privacy definition
that will allow us to produce a strongly accurate almost minimum spanning tree topology.
Definition 3.3.1 (`∞-Neighboring weight functions). For any edge set E, two weight
functions w,w′ ∈WE are `∞-neighboring, denoted w ∼`∞ w′, if∣∣w −w′∣∣∞ ∶= max
e∈E ∣w(e) −w′(e)∣ ≤ 1/2.
The bound is set to 1/2 for simplicity of the proofs, it also allows one to consider an `∞
ball of diameter 1 defined around the real weight function by analogy to the `1 ball from
Definition 2.2.1. Moreover, as will be explained later, the results we obtain are scalable
since they trivially adapt to the initial sensitivity of the weights, therefore this arbitrary
24 CHAPTER 3. PRIVATE MINIMUM SPANNING TREE
Figure 3.2: Graph sketching framework applied on a population of size 4 (N) and 3 ques-
tions (M). Only the co-occurrence of the response "yes" between the question 1 and the
other questions is observed (E)
choice of bound is not an issue. The neighborhood between graphs and the definition of
`∞-weight-differential privacy directly adapts from those introduced in Section 2.2.
Definition 3.3.2 (`∞-Weight differential privacy). For any graph topology G = (V,E), letA be any randomized algorithm that takes as input a weight function w ∈WE. A is called(, δ)-`∞-weight differentially private on G = (V,E) if for all pairs of `∞-neighboring weight
functions w,w′ ∈WE, and for all set of possible outputs S, one has
P[A(w) ∈ S] ≤ eP[A(w′) ∈ S] + δ.
If A is (, δ)-differentially private on every graph topology in a class C, it can be denoted
as (, δ)-differentially private on C.
Finally one should introduce the graph-based exponential mechanism. For the remain-
ing of this document, the graph-based exponential mechanism is referred to as exponential
mechanism specifying only if it is necessary.
Definition 3.3.3 (Graph-based Exponential mechanism). Given some graph topology G =(V,E), an output range R ⊂ E, a privacy parameter  > 0, an utility function uG ∶=WE ×R → R, and some w ∈ WE the graph-based exponential mechanism MExp(G,w, uG ,R, )
selects and outputs an element r ∈R with probability proportional to exp ( uG(w,r)2∆u ).
The Exponential mechanism and the new definitions of privacy on weighted graphs are
the key elements of our new algorithm for producing an almost minimum spanning tree
topology under differential privacy constraints. We call the algorithm PAMST.
3.4 PAMST algorithm
PAMST relies on a Prim-like minimum spanning tree construction ensuring that at every
iteration of the algorithm the nearest neighbor is not automatically chosen, but the expo-
nential mechanism provides an approximated nearest neighbor under differential privacy
constraints. This algorithm implies an iterative use of the exponential mechanism, it is
thus necessary to define what utility function this mechanism is going to use.
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Let G = (V,E,w) be a simple-undirected-weighted graph, G its topology, and R a set of
edges from E. The utility function used in the iterative call of the exponential mechanism
is
uG ∶ WE ×R → R(w, r) ↦ −∣w(r) −min
r′∈Rw(r′)∣
Given the above setting, without normalization on the edges weight, one has ∆uG = 1 for
any non empty R (the change of an individual in the database can change each weight by
at most 1), and with normalization ∆uG = 1/∣E∣. For the sake of comparison to the Laplace
Post-processing [Sea16], normalization is needed to obtain a maximum global variation of
the weights less or equal to 1 (in such a setting one can consider `∞ differential privacy as
a particular case of `1 differential privacy). The intuition of why it is possible to release
an exact-weight-based spanning tree is as follows: the exponential mechanism, by using an
utility function to give some pre-order on R transfers the private information contained inR to an order in R. Thus, to keep the mechanism differentially private, it suffices to keep
the outputs of u private instead of the values from R.
Additional notations: Let S be a set of nodes from G, and RS the set of edges that
is incident to one and only one node in S (also denoted xor-incident). For any edge r in
such a set, the incident node to r that is not in S is denoted r→. T Finally, the restriction
of the weight function to an edge set R is denoted w∣R.
Algorithm 1 Private Approximated Minimum Spanning Tree PAMST(G, uG ,w, )
Require: A graph topology G = (V,E), a weight function w, a degree of privacy , utility
function uG .
Ensure: The topology of an approximated minimum spanning tree represented by SE a
set of edges.
Pick v ∈ V arbitrarily
SV ← {v}
SE ← ∅
while SV ≠ V do
r =MExp(G,w, uG ,RSV , ∣V ∣−1)
SV ← SV ∪ {r→}
SE ← SE ∪ {r}
end while
return SE
PAMST takes as an input a graph topology, and a weight function associated to its
set of edges. It outputs the topology of a spanning tree which weight according to the
weight function is almost minimal. To do so, the algorithm starts at an arbitrarily chosen
vertex, and chooses one of its xor-incident edges according to the exponential mechanism
and updates the set of edges with it. Then it adds the second node forming this edge to
the current node set. While the node set does not contain all the nodes of the topology,
PAMST continues to choose at each step an edge that is xor-incident to the current node
set to update the edge set, and updates the node set accordingly.
Let us now introduce some results about the privacy and accuracy of PAMST. The
privacy guarantees mostly rely on the properties of the exponential mechanism and the
ability of differential privacy to compose, while the privacy/accuracy trade-off is less ele-
mentary. The following theorems firstly presents the privacy guarantees, and secondly the
accuracy of this new method in the `∞-weight differential privacy framework.
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Theorem 3.4.1. Let G = (V,E) be the topology of a simple-undirected graph, then ∀ > 0,
PAMST (G, ⋅, ) is -differentially private on G for `∞ neighborhood notions.
Proof 3.4.1. Let G = (V,E) be a simple undirected weighted graph topology,  a pri-
vacy degree, and w ∈ WE a weight function. At every step of PAMST(G, uG ,w, ),MExp (G,w, uG ,RSV , ∣V ∣−1) is ∣V ∣−1 -`∞-weight-differentially private by property of the Ex-
ponential mechanism (Proposition 1.5.1). This property is independent of the neighborhood
notion since the Exponential mechanism scales its distribution with ∆u which directly de-
pends on the neighborhood notion at hand, here the `∞ neighboring.
Since Algorithm 1 is no more than ∣V ∣ − 1 adaptive calls of ∣V ∣−1 differentially private
mechanisms, Proposition 1.4.3 gives us that Algorithm 1 is -differentially private on G
regardless of the chosen neighborhood notion. ∎
Remark 3.4.1. By notation abuse, one can state that this algorithm is -weight-differentially
private since it does not depend on the neighboring definition. In fact, even though one
only focuses here on the `∞ setting, PAMST could also be -`1-weight-differentially private
if used with an other framework.
Let us now introduce the theoretical bound for Algorithm 1 that highlights the pri-
vacy/accuracy trade-off for this new method.
Theorem 3.4.2. Let G = (G,w), w ∈WE, and  > 0. Let one denote {R1, ...,R∣V ∣−1} the
ranges used in the successive calls of the exponential mechanism in PAMST(G, uG ,w, ), T
the spanning tree topology returned by this algorithm and w(T ) its associated total weight,
then one has
w(T ) −w∗ < 2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ⎛⎝(∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣V ∣ − 1γ ) + ∣V ∣−1∑i=1 ln ∣Ri∣⎞⎠
with probability at least 1 − γ, and with w∗ = ∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 minr∈Riw(r).
Proof 3.4.2. For clarity of the proof, let us denote ′ ∶= ∣V ∣−1 , OPTi ∶= OPTuG (w∣Ri),
ui ∶= uG (w,MExp (G,w, uG ,Ri, ′)), and finally ri ∈ Ri the edge selected at the ith step of
the algorithm.
According to Proposition 1.5.2 one gets ∀i ∈ [∣V ∣ − 1]
P [ui ≤ OPTi − 2∆uG
′ (t + ln ∣Ri∣)] ≤ e−t.
Then, by union bound, one gets
P [∃i s.t {ui ≤ OPTi − 2∆uG
′ (t + ln ∣Ri∣)}] ≤ (∣V ∣ − 1)e−t.
This probability is also straightforwardly an upper bound of
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ui ≤
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 OPTi − 2∆uG′ (t + ln ∣Ri∣)
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
Given the form of the chosen utility function, one gets ∀i ∈ [∣V ∣ − 1], OPTi = 0. Moreover
∆uG = 1/∣E∣, thus
=P⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ui ≤ − 2∣E∣′ ⎛⎝(∣V ∣ − 1) t +
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ln ∣Ri∣⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ .
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Since ui = min
r∈Riw(r) −w(ri) , on gets ∣V ∣−1∑i=1 ui = w∗ − ∣V ∣−1∑i=1 w(ri), thus
=P⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣w∗ −
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 w(ri) ≤ − 2∣E∣′ ⎛⎝(∣V ∣ − 1) t +
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ln ∣Ri∣⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Setting (∣V ∣ − 1)e−t = γ, replacing ′, since w(T ) = ∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 w(ri), and using the equation (5)
and (2) one gets
P
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 w(ri) −w∗ ≥ 2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ⎛⎝(∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣V ∣ − 1γ ) +
∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ln ∣Ri∣⎞⎠
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ ≤ γ
therefore, one finally gets
w(T ) −w∗ < 2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ⎛⎝(∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣V ∣ − 1γ ) + ∣V ∣−1∑i=1 ln ∣Ri∣⎞⎠
with probability at least 1 − γ. ∎
This theorem gives the difference between the weight of the output tree topology, and
the value w∗ which is the sum of the optimal choices at every step of the algorithm. Since
the steps are fixed, selecting the minimal weighted edge at every step does not necessarily
produce a tree, this is why, to obtain a theoretical bound for the error on the weight of the
minimum spanning tree of G, one need the following result.
Proposition 3.4.1. Let G = (V,E,w) the studied graph, if one denotes w(T ∗) the weight
of the minimum spanning tree on G, given the above notation, one has w∗ ≤ w(T ∗).
Proof 3.4.3. Let G = (v,E,w), T the minimum spanning tree of G denoted by a set of
edges (ei)i∈{1,...,∣V ∣−1}. One can always consider w (e1) < ... < w (e∣V ∣−1). We only consider
the strict inequalities for readability of the proof, however a generalization of this proof to
classical inequalities is straightforward due to the fact that treating the equality cases is
immediate . Let us also denote (Si)i∈[∣V ∣−1] the sets of nodes at every step of the algorithm,(Ri)i∈[∣V ∣−1] the corresponding xor-incident edges, and finally ∀i ∈ [∣V ∣ − 1], Ii = ∪
j∈[i]Rj the
sets of edges that are incident to one of the nodes in Si. For readability of the proof, we
also denote by ∣.∣T the number of edges from T that a set of edges contains.
Lemma 3.4.1. For all i in [∣V ∣−1], Ri contains at least one edge from T , and Ii contains
at least i edges from T .
Proof 3.4.4. Let us first suppose that ∃i ∈ [∣V ∣−1] such that Ri contains no edge from T ,
then we managed to produce a cut of the graph (Si, V /Si) such that no edge of T crosses
it. By definition of a spanning tree, this is impossible. Therefore for all i in [∣V ∣ − 1],∣Ri∣T ≥ 1.
Second, let us show by recurrence that for all n ∈ [∣V ∣ − 1] Pn ∶= "∣In∣T ≥ n" is true.
P1 is true according to the first point of this theorem and since R1 = I1. Given k ∈ [∣V ∣−2],
let us suppose that Pk is true. If Ik+1/Ik =Rk+1/Ik ≠ ∅ then Pk+1 is automatically satisfied.
Else let us suppose that ∣Ik∣T ≤ k, then ∣Ik+1∣T ≤ k. According to the first part of the
proposition, ∃q ≥ 1 such that ∣Rk+1∣T = q, therefore ∣Ik+1/Rk+1∣T ≤ k − q. Then the graph
edge-induced by Ik+1/Rk+1 contains at least q + 1 subtrees of T . Since ∣Rk+1∣T = q, at least
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one subtree, denoted S∗, does not have an incident edge in T ∩Rk+1. We just produced
a cut (S∗, V /S∗) such that no edge of T crosses it. This contradiction implies that our
assumption is false, then ∣Ik∣T = ∣Ik+1∣T ≥ k + 1. We just proved that Pk implies Pk+1,
therefore Lemma 3.4.1 is proved by recurrence. ∎
Let k > 1, for all j > k, thanks to Lemma 3.4.1 ∣Ij ∣T ≥ j. At least j − k + 1 edges in
Ij ∩ T have a weight lower or equal to w(e∣V ∣−k) by definition of (ei)i∈[∣V ∣−1], thus at least
j−k steps of the algorithm had an optimal solution with weight lower or equal to w(e∣V ∣−k).
In particular for j = ∣V ∣ − 1, at least ∣V ∣ − k steps of the algorithm had an optimal solution
with weight lower or equal to w(e∣V ∣−k). Therefore, for all k ≥ 2, their is at most k − 1 sets{Ri1 , ...,Rik−1} such that min
r∈Ri. w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−k).
Then, in the worst case scenario, ∀k ∈ [2, ∣V ∣−1], there exists exactly k−1 steps such that
min
r∈Ri. w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−k). The only possible way to have such sets is if one has {i1, ..., i∣V ∣−1}
such that min
r∈Ri1 w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−2) ≤ minr∈Ri2 w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−3)... > w(e1) ≥ minr∈Ri∣V ∣−1 w(r). More-
over, since ∀i ∈ [V − 1], ∣Ri∣T ≥ 1, then ∀i ∈ [V − 1],w(e∣V ∣−1) ≥ min
r∈Riw(r). Finally, one
has w(e∣V ∣−1) ≥ min
r∈Ri1 w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−2) ≤ minr∈Ri2 w(r) > w(e∣V ∣−3)... > w(e1) ≥ minr∈Ri∣V ∣−1 w(r)
therefore w∗ = ∑
i∈[∣V ∣−1]minr∈Riw(r) ≤ ∑i∈[∣V ∣−1]w(e∣V ∣−i) = w(T ) ∎
To conclude on the theoretical worst case error of the algorithm, we introduce the
following corollary, using the approximation error from Definition 3.2.1.
Corollary 3.4.1. Let G = (G,w) be a weighted graph,  > 0, and T = PAMST (G,w, ),
then
ErrorG (T ) ≤ 2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ((∣V ∣ − 1) ln ∣V ∣ − 1γ + 2 ln ((V − 1)!))
with probability 1 − γ.
Proof 3.4.5. Since for any {R1, ...,R∣V ∣−1} the sets of xor-incident edges, one has ∣Ri∣ ≤
i (∣V ∣ − i), thus ∣V ∣−1∑
i=1 ln ∣Ri∣ = ln(∣V ∣−1∏i=1 ∣Ri∣) ≤ ln(∣V ∣−1∏i=1 i (∣V ∣ − i)) = 2 ln ((V − 1)!). Therefore,
this corollary is proved by binding the Theorem 3.4.2 and Proposition 3.4.1. ∎
According to the above corollary, the theoretical bound is useful when the studied graph
is dense. In fact, if ∣E∣ ≃ V (V − 1)/2, the bound becomes O (ln(V − 1)) for fixed privacy
parameters. Therefore, the presented algorithm is particularly suited to the study of dense
networks, allowing to keep differential privacy for almost no approximation error. Given
the achieved positive results, it is natural to compare this new In-processing method to
the Post-processing Laplace mechanism. To do so, Section 3.5 produces a theoretical and
empirical comparison of the error of both methods.
3.5 Bounds comparison
This section produces two theorems for comparing the two theoretical bounds (Theo-
rem 3.2.1 versus Corollary 3.4.1). The first one gives a bound according to the degree of
certainty γ, and the number ∣V ∣ of nodes in the graph. The second one does not depend
on the parameters. First, let us introduce some notations, and recall the definition of the
Lambert W-function.
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Definition 3.5.1 (Lambert W-function). The Lambert W-function, denotedW , also called
the omega function, is the inverse function of f where∀z ∈ C, f(z) = zez
Denoting BExp,,γ the bound from Corollary 3.4.1 and BLap,,γ the one from Theo-
rem 3.2.1 the first comparison theorem is as follows.
Theorem 3.5.1. Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph, given that we evaluate the bounds
of the two mechanisms according to the same degrees of certainty and privacy γ and , we
have
if α ≥ γ
n
eW (ln(hn,γ)) then BExp,γ ≤ BLap,γ
with
hn,γ ∶= γ−nγ (2pi) 1γ n 3n+1γ e− 2nγ + 16nγ
and with the following notations: ∣E∣ being the number of edges in a connected graph
and ∣V ∣ its number of nodes, one can always write ∣E∣ = α(∣V ∣−1) with α ≥ 1 (α can be seen
as a non-normalized density of the graph). Moreover for readability, we denote (∣V ∣−1) = n.
Proof 3.5.1. Let us first recall the following lemma:
Lemma 3.5.1. [Rob85] ∀n ∈ N∗,
n! ≤ √2pinn+ 12 e−n+ 112n
Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph. Let us consider that we have fixed values for γ
and .
One has that:BExp,γ ≤ BLap,γ
⇔2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ((∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣V ∣ − 1γ ) + 2 ln ((∣V ∣ − 1)!)) ≤ 2(∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣E∣γ )
denoting ∣E∣ = α(∣V ∣ − 1) and (∣V ∣ − 1) = n
⇔ 2n
αn
(n ln(n
γ
) + 2 ln (n!)) ≤ 2n

ln(αn
γ
)
⇔ 1
αn
(n ln(n
γ
) + 2 ln (n!)) ≤ ln(αn
γ
)
Using Lemma 3.5.1, it is sufficent to show:
1
αn
(n ln(n
γ
) + ln (2pin2n+1e−2n+ 16n )) ≤ ln(αn
γ
)
⇔ 1
αn
ln ((hn,γ)γ) ≤ ln(αn
γ
)
⇔ γ
αn
ln (hn,γ) ≤ ln(αn
γ
)
⇔ ln (hn,γ) ≤ αn
γ
ln(αn
γ
) = g (αn
γ
) (3.1)
g ∶= g(x) = x ln(x) is a non-decreasing function on R+, thus solving ln(hn,γ) = g (αnγ )
is sufficient to find the value α∗ such that for all α bigger than this value, Equation (3.1)
is satisfied.
To find such a solution it suffices to remark that g(x) = ln(x)eln(x) thus using the
Lambert W-function one gets ln (αnγ ) =W (ln(hn,γ)), therefore α∗ = γneW (hn,γ). ∎
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If the second result is not as tight as the first one, it has the asset of depending neither
on the order of the graph or any privacy/certainty degree.
Theorem 3.5.2. Let G = (V,E,w) be a simple-undirected-weighted graph, Regardless of
the degrees of certainty and privacy γ and , one has that
α ≥ 3 Ô⇒ BExp,,γ ≤ BLap,,γ
Proof 3.5.2. Let G=(V,E,w) be a weighted graph. Let us consider that we have fixed
values for γ,. One has that:
BExp,γ ≤ BLap,γ
⇔2(∣V ∣ − 1)∣E∣ ((∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣V ∣ − 1γ ) + 2 ln ((∣V ∣ − 1)!)) ≤ 2(∣V ∣ − 1) ln(∣E∣γ )
denoting ∣E∣ = α(∣V ∣ − 1) and (∣V ∣ − 1) = n⇔ 2n
αn
(n ln(n
γ
) + 2 ln (n!)) ≤ 2n

ln(αn
γ
)
Since n! ≤ nn it suffices to show
ln(n
γ
) + 2 ln(n) ≤ α ln(αn
γ
) (3.2)
Finally, γ ∈ (0,1], ln (nγ ) ≥ ln(n), one thus easily gets that Eq. (3.2) is satisfied for any
α ≥ 3. ∎
3.6 Experimental comparison of the methods
HHHHHHp
 0.1 0.4 0.7 1.0 MST cost
Laplace 0.1 4055.5± 90.6 2191.2 ±67 1301.9±42.9 876.4±30.5 114-125
PAMST 0.1 322.3±12.5 45.7±3.1 16.8±1.4 8.5±0.8
Laplace 0.3 4139.3±77.3 2280.1±72.2 1384.5±41.1 965.0±31.8 39-42
PAMST 0.3 108.7± 3.8 15.2±1.0 5.6±0.5 2.8±0.3
Laplace 0.5 4152.8±84.0 2298.4±77.2 1396.2±47.8 975.7±29.7 23-25
PAMST 0.5 64.7±2.5 9.1±0.6 3.4±0.2 1.7±0.2
Laplace 0.7 4151.0±95.2 2291.3±67.3 1400.4±42.5 979.6±31.0 17-18
PAMST 0.7 64.7±2.5 9.1±0.6 2.4±0.2 1.2±0.1
Laplace 0.9 4159.6±82.6 2297.9±62.2 1408.3±44.2 983.8±32.8 13-14
PAMST 0.9 36.2±1.6 5.0±0.3 1.9±0.2 0.9±0.1
Table 3.1: Expected approximation error of Laplace and PAMST according to the Erdös
Renyi probability for simulation (p), a degree of privacy () and confidence interval with
probability 0.95. The size of the simulated graph is around p2 × 105, and an approximated
interval of values (a-b) of the minimum spanning tree real cost for every density is indicated
(MST cost).
To conclude this analysis of PAMST algorithm, we conducted some experiments on
simulated graphs to visualize the improvement of PAMST in comparison to a post-
processing of the Laplace mechanism. The following experiments investigate the expected
approximation error for the spanning tree topologies produced rather by PAMST or the
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Figure 3.3: Evaluation of the expected approximation error of the tree produced by post
-processing Laplace mechanism and PAMST with confidence intervals with probability
0.95 (unreadable because too close to the curves)
Laplace mechanism. Formally, it estimates E (ErrorG (TPAMST )), and E (ErrorG (TLaplace))
with the obvious notation TM the tree produced by the algorithm M and with the prob-
ability space being on the simplex of the mechanism. Figure 3.3 represents the expected
approximation error of the two mechanisms according to a degree of privacy  ∈ (0,1] for
a graph Erdös-Renyi graph with probability 0.1. The expected error calculus is based on
computing the mean value of the spanning tree error for each tree method for the simula-
tion of a hundred graphs. For every graph, the weight of each edge is randomly sampled
from a standard uniform distribution U(0,10).The expected approximation error is thus
produced according to a Monte-Carlos type estimation, with for each point a confidence
interval with probability 0.95. As expected from the theoretical bounds, PAMST widely
outperforms the Post-processing Laplace mechanism. Figure 3.3 is only a visualization of
the shape of the two errors functions, Table 3.1 represents a more extensive study of both
of those expected errors for several densities and privacy parameters. The analysis of this
table highlights some interesting points about both methods. First, the Post-processing
of the Laplace mechanism do not adapt to the density of the graph, which is mostly due
to the fact that the Laplace mechanism adds random noise to the edges, regardless of the
number of edges in the graph since the sensitivity is set to one. Second, the weight are
simulated from a uniform distribution, therefore, the number of edges with small weights
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increase uniformly with the density of the graph. This implies that at every iteration of
the exponential mechanism, the probability to sample an edge with close-to-optimal weight
increase.
Such a great accuracy does not come without any cost. Our new method is a strong
tool to ensure privacy and accuracy, however, sampling from a new distribution at ev-
ery stage of the algorithm is quite expensive in terms of computation time. Producing a
tree according to the PAMST method on a graph of size 5 × 105 takes about 40 seconds
(Intel®Xeon®E5-2667 V4 3.20 GHz processor), which is quite faster than a Kruskal al-
gorithm (efficient C++/Boost implementation takes more than a minute) but way slower
than a prim algorithm (efficient C++ implementation takes less than 1 second). This
contrast is mostly due to the use of priority queue in the implementation prim algorithm.
This kind of implementation is not allowed for PAMST since the exponential mechanism
should be independently computed at each step of the algorithm, and since there is no
trivial way of computing an accurate priority queue for the whole graph.
3.7 Discussion
First, PAMST algorithm is presented here in a global framework where the maximal sensi-
tivity of every edge weight is 1/2. This choice, as well as the choice of normalization is made
so that our method can compare to the former one [Sea16]. We produced results according
to this framework, however every results are scalable to any real factor. This means that
if we multiply the weights sensitivity or the degree of privacy by a factor M , the bound
presented in Corollary 3.4.1 will also scale to M . Second, the main conception difference
between PAMST and the former methods is that the privacy mechanism is directly in the
spanning tree construction (In-processing) while until now, the release of such a statistic
on the graph has only been allowed by Post-processing of a more general sanitizing, for
example, the Laplace mechanism. Sanitizing all the weights has the advantage of allowing
the analyst to release any information on the Post-processing according to the Proposi-
tion 1.4.1, this is why, while producing a minimum spanning tree topology according to the
Laplace mechanism, the analyst can automatically release the noisy-weights of the selected
edges. However, sanitizing all the graph weights with the Laplace mechanism is costly in
terms of accuracy. PAMST is an algorithm that releases only the topology of the spanning
tree. It selects every edge according to the exact weight function of the graph. The choice
of releasing, at first, only the topology of the spanning tree is a winning strategy in terms
of accuracy, but since the weight could be useful for any post-processing of the spanning
tree, one may want to use a classical numeric mechanism to release a noisy version of those
weights. Since we only sanitize the weights of the tree instead of the whole graph weights,
the amount of noise needed is much lower especially for dense graphs. Finally, releasing the
tree weights with -differential privacy makes the global release of the weighted spanning
tree 2-differentially private, however, given the composition theorem and the scalability
of our method one can choose to rescale the parameters of the two mechanisms to make
the weighted tree release -differentially private with only a small accuracy loss.
Chapter 4 introduces a new way of conceiving differentially private clustering which is
differentially private MST-based clustering. Two way of constructing such an analysis are
presented and tested on several toy datasets.
Chapter 4
Application to private node
clustering
Graph clustering [Sch07] appears to be a key tool for understanding the underlying struc-
ture of many data sets by locating nodes groups ruled by a specific similarity. The minimum
spanning tree is known to help recognizing clusters with arbitrary shapes in MST-based
clustering algorithms and thus can be used for wider applications than community detec-
tion. This kind of structure adapted clustering could pave the way to mutual interaction
analysis in genomics, proteomics, or even web analysis where privacy-preserving is not an
option but a strong requirement. Chapter 4 aims at providing a new field in private data
analysis denoted node clustering in a graph under weight differential privacy. Although
clustering using differentially private has already been studied ([NRS07, JLE14] ), to our
knowledge, this is the first time node clustering under weight-differential privacy is inves-
tigated. Section 4.1 provides some motivations for the use of MST-based clustering, while
the remaining ones will present how to produce an MST-based differentially private node
clustering algorithm and some preliminary experimental results.
4.1 Motivation for MST-clustering and DBMSTClu
The minimum spanning tree is surely the most famous sparse representation of a weighted
graph. MST-based algorithms rely on the idea that the structure of a graph is well repre-
sented by its MST. Xu et al. produced Claim 4.1.1 tried to formalize this idea.
Claim 4.1.1 ([XOX02]). If one takes two points c1, c2 of a cluster C, then all data points
in the tree path connecting c1 and c2 in the MST must be in C.
To justify the use of any MST-based, we first introduce a specific definition of the sep-
arability condition of a cluster enriching [XOX02], and second give a proof for Claim 4.1.1
Definition 4.1.1 (Separability condition of a cluster). Let G = (V,E,w) a simple-undirected-
weighted graph, (V, d) be a metric space defined in G according to the minimal-weighted
path between nodes, and D ⊂ V a dataset. C ⊂ D is called a cluster if and only if for any
partition C = C1 ⊍C2 one has
arg min
v∈D−C1 {min{d(v, c)∣c ∈ C1}} ∈ C2.
Proof 4.1.1 (of Claim 4.1.1). Let c1, c2 two points of a cluster C. Let denote TD the MST
of the graph induced by D in G (one can suppose it is connected for clarity). Since the
minimum spanning tree is a tree, their is an only path between c1 and c2 in TD. Moreover
since the graph is simple one can characterize this path by the succession of nodes it goes
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through. Let suppose there exists v ∈ D in such a path such that v is not in C. Let C1 be
the maximal connected component of TD, containing c1, for which all nodes are in C, and
C2 = C −C1. C2 is not empty since at least c2 ∈ C2, therefore C = C1 ⊍C2. By construction
of C1, its nearest neighbor cannot be in C and thus it is not in C2. This contradiction gives
us that C is not a cluster and therefore the claim is proved by contraposition. ∎
Figure 4.1: Visualization of the general method for MST-based node clustering
This claim seams to be a good theoretical motivation for the use MST-based clustering.
After investigating the most famous MST based algorithm (MSDR [ZGH11]) to have a
global understanding of this kind a algorithms, we focused on a new method for MST-based
node clustering denoted DBMSTClu introduced by Morvan and al. in [MCGA17] and
presented in Algorithm 2. The choice of this algorithm is mostly due to it simplicity (it does
not need any parameter adjustments), its efficiency (refer to [MCGA17]) and the ability
to have an iterative and useful exchange with the authors. As illustrated by Figure 4.1,
and like most of the MST-based clustering algorithm DBMSTClu starts by computing
the minimum spanning tree of the graph, before performing some cuts among the edges
of the tree according to a criteria on the edge weights. It aims, after several steps of well
chosen cuts, at releasing a forest where each tree represents a cluster (the nodes that are
in the same tree form a cluster). To give a good understanding of the splitting criteria for
DBMSTClu one must first introduce the following definitions.
Definition 4.1.2 (Cluster Separation). The Separation of a cluster Ci, denoted SEP (Ci),
is defined as the minimum distance between the nodes of Ci, and the ones of all other
clusters Cj, i ≠ j,1 ≤ i, j ≤ K, where K is the total number of clusters. In practice, it
corresponds to the minimum weight among all already cut edges from T incident to a node
from Ci. If K = 1, the Separation is set to 1. More formally, with Sj the subtree of T
corresponding to Cj,
∀i ∈ [K], SEP (Ci) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
j∈[K],cj∈Cuts(Ci)w(cj) if K ≠ 1
1 otherwise.
High values for Separation means that the cluster is well separated from the other
clusters while low values suggest that the cluster is well connected to other clusters.
Definition 4.1.3 (Cluster Dispersion). The Dispersion of a cluster Ci, denoted DISP (Ci),
represented by the subtree Si of T is defined as the maximum edge weight of Si. If the clus-
ter is a singleton (i.e only contain one node), the corresponding Dispersion is set to 1.
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More formally, with Sj the subtree of T corresponding to Cj,
∀i ∈ [K], DISP (Ci) = ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
min
ej∈Sjw(ej) if Cj is not a singleton
0 otherwise.
The validity index of a cluster and the validity index of a clustering partition are based
on a normalized comparison of those to criterion and are the keystone to criterion for the
DBMSTCLu algorithm
Definition 4.1.4 (Validity index of a cluster). Let i ∈ [K], and Ci a cluster of nodes, the
validity index of Ci is defined as
VC(Ci) = SEP (Ci) −DISP (Ci)
max(SEP (Ci),DISP (Ci))
Definition 4.1.5 (Validity index of a clustering partition). The validity index of a partition
Π = {Ci}i∈[K], denoted DBCV I(Π), is defined as the weighted average of the validity
indices of all the clusters in the partition. denoting N the number of of points in the
dataset, one has
DBCV I(Π) = ∑
i∈[K]
∣Ci∣
N
VC(Ci)
Algorithm 2 DBMSTClu(T ,w) [MCGA17]
Require: A tree-topology T , a weight function w.
Ensure: A list of node clusters represented by a list of subtrees of T .
splitDBCV I ← −1
cut_candidate_list← [edges(T )]
clusters = []
while splitDBCV I < 1 do
optimalcut← None
tempDBCV I ← splitDBCV I
for each cut in cut_candidate_list do
newClusters← performCut(clusters, cut)
newDBCV I ← getDBCV I(newclusters,T )
if newDBCV I ≥ tempDBCV I then
optimal_cut← cut
tempDBCV I ← newDBCV I
end if
end for
if optimal_cut ≠ None then
clusters← performCut(clusters, optimal_cut)
splitDBCV I ← getDBCV I(clusters,T )
remove optimal_cut from cut_candidate_list
else
splitDBCV I ← 1
end if
end while
return clusters
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Additionnal notations: performCut is the routine performing the cut corresponding
to the edge in parameter with respect to already formed clusters. getDBCVI is the function
computing the Validation Index of the Clustering partition in parameter according to the
initial MST.
DBMSTClu is summarized in Algorithm 2. It starts from a partition with one clus-
ter containing the whole dataset, and initializes the current value of DBCVI to -1 (the
worst possible value). While there exists a cut which makes the current DBCVI greater,
DBMSTClu greedily chooses the cut which maximizes the obtained DBCVI among all the
possible cuts. When no direct improvement is possible, the algorithm stops. It returns the
partition for which no improvement has been found. The main strength of this algorithm
is that it is not parametric, therefore trying to construct a private algorithm based on this
method will not force us to do a complex and tiresome parameter search. How to trans-
form this deterministic algorithm for node clustering in a graph into a weight-differentially
private method is thus what one should aim. As explained in Section 3.1 their is two
main ways of constructing a private method named In-processing and Post-processing.
For MST-based clustering the Post-processing method could rely on the construction of
a private minimum spanning tree as a Pre-processing of a deterministic MST-based algo-
rithm such as DBMSTClu. However In-processing methods are known to be strongly
accurate, we chose to investigate this Post-processing method, given the work we produced
on weight differentially private MST construction, and given that such a method will fit
to any MST-based algorithm, leaving the In-processing DBMSTClu clustering for future
work.
Section 4.2 provides some simple theoretical conditions on the separability of the node
clusters such that clustering based on a weight-differentially private approximated mini-
mum spanning tree will not be too inaccurate, and experiments comparing the results of
Private DBMSTClu based on the Laplace private MST or based on a PAMST output.
4.2 Post-processing private MST-based clustering
To introduce privacy in any MST-based node clustering, one can choose to produce first a
approximated minimum spanning tree under weight differential privacy and then use this
spanning tree in any MST-based algorithm. This Post-processing of a private approximated
minimum spanning tree has the asset of being adaptable to any kind of clustering using
the MST. This work only presents experiments for a private DBMSTClu, although this
method can be trivially generalized to any MST-based algorithm.
Chapter 3 presented and compared two ways of producing an approximated minimum
spanning tree under weight-differential privacy constraints. PAMST has been proven to
be a much more accurate method in most cases, however the following theorem gives some
conditions for the graph-based Laplace mechanism to sufficiently preserve the structure
of the graph such that a MST-based algorithm using the Laplace Post-processing MST
should produce an efficient clustering.
Theorem 4.2.1. Let G = (V,E,w) be an weighted graph, if one constructs K > 1 sets of
edges (E1, ...,EK) such that:
i, j ∈ [K], i < j Ô⇒ ∀e ∈ Ei, e′ ∈ Ej ,w(e) < w(e′) (4.1)
Then Eq. (4.1) holds on G′ =MGbL(G, ) with probability greater than
1− ∑
i∈[K−1] exp(−ti,i+1) (12 + ti,i+14 ) (Ei +Ei+1 − 1) With ti,i+1 = mine∈Ei,e′∈Ei+1 {w(e′) −w(e)} .
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Proof 4.2.1. Let G = (V,E,w) be a weighted graph, and (ei)i∈[∣E∣] the set of weight-ordered
edge of G such that ∀i ∈ [∣E∣] ,w(ei) ≤ w(ei+1). Let G′ = G = (V,E,w′) =MGbL(G, ), one
has ∀i ∈ [∣E∣] ,w′(ei) = w(ei) + Yi with Yi ∼ Lap(1/). Let us give what the probability that
the order has been preserved is, i.e
P (w′(e1) ≤ w′(e2) ≤ ... ≤ w′(en))
To begin with, one can consider Y1, Y2
iid∼ Lap(1/). Thus one has by symmetry of the
Laplace distribution that
P (w(e1) + Y1 ≤ w(e2) + Y2) = FX1+X2 (w(e2) −w(e1))
Moreover, one can easily show that
Y1, Y2
iid∼ Lap(1/) Ô⇒ fY1+Y2 = 4 (1 + ∣u∣) exp (−∣u∣)
Therefore one gets∀t > 0, FY1+Y2(t) = 1 − exp(t) (12 + t4 ) (4.2)
Using the union bound and the iid property one gets
P (∃i, i + 1, s.t w′(ei) > w′(ei+1)) ≤ (1 − FY1+Y2 ( min
i∈[∣E∣−1]{w(ei) −w(ei+1)})) × (∣E∣ − 1)
(4.3)
In particular, if one wants to preserve the block structure between K > 1 sets (E1, ...,EK),
one can easily extend Eq. (4.3) to Eq. (4.1) using Eq. (4.2) ∎
Remark 4.2.1. One will found in Appendix A.3 of this document the demonstration of
the density of a sum of independent Laplace laws, as well as their distribution function for
any t > 0.
As illustrated by Figure 4.2 this theorem is much more of a local condition. In fact, if a
dataset only has a few edges that are sensitive to noise injection (represented in Figure 4.2
by the nodes connected by an edge in the Potential meeting zone), Theorem 4.2.1 will
provide some theoretical guarantees on the clustering. For example if one wants to preserve
1000 well chosen weighted edges in an spanning tree construction with 1-differential privacy,
given that the minimum weight of an edge in the meeting zone is 10, those weights will
be preserved with probability higher than 1− exp(−10) (12 + 104 ) (1000−1) ≃ 0.86. However
as soon as the number of distances one wants to preserve becomes too numerous, the
privacy becomes too strong, or the distance between clusters too small, Theorem 4.2.1 is
quickly overstepped. This is why one could think of a private MST-based clustering using
an approximated minimum spanning tree from the Post-processing Laplace method only
when the clusters are well separated, and the privacy parameter close to 1. Relying on
Section 3.5, we claim that clustering based on an output of PAMST should be at least as
accurate as the one from a Post-processing Laplace method.
Section 4.3 presents an empirical investigation of this claim showing that private clus-
tering using an approximated minimum spanning tree produced by PAMST is a more
robust way to obtain clustering algorithm under differential privacy constraints.
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Figure 4.2: Visualization of two node clusters, based on the euclidean distance between
the nodes. The potential meeting zones represents the edges sensitive to the addition of
noise. Those are the edges that may cause the clusters to collapse.
4.3 Clustering experiments
We conducted some experiments on arbitrarily shaped datasets to compare the two meth-
ods evoked in Section 4.1 for nodes clustering under differential privacy constraints. For
this purpose, some datasets has been simulated based on 1000 uniform point sampling
over arbitrary shapes, perturbed by some random Gaussian noise. Given that the privacy
definitions scale to 1, we chose to also scale the variation of this random noise to 1. Each
simulated datasets is composed of well separated clusters, and therefore, constitute a suit-
able benchmark for the evaluation of any clustering method. Although those datasets are
not initially graphs, as evoked in Figure 4.2, the euclidean distance matrix between all
node pairs can be interpreted as complete weighted graphs and thus MST-based clustering
can be performed. Moreover, the gap between the accuracy PAMST and the Laplace
Post-processing increases accordingly with the density of the graph, we choose to narrow
it down by computing an -graph of the distance matrix. Figure 4.3 gives a visualization
of this graph for one of the dataset we simulated. For the following, we omit to represent
the edges of this dataset for readability of the figures. Finally, according to Section 3.7 and
since DBMSTClu needs the to use the weights of the tree to produce a partition of the
dataset, one has to decompose the releasing of a weighted approximated minimum span-
ning tree into two parts. Therefore, we firstly produce the topology of the spanning tree
using PAMST under 1/2-differential privacy, and secondly add random noise to ensure
1/2-differential privacy on the weights of this tree-topology.
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Figure 4.3: Simple visualization of the -graph based on the euclidean matrix distance of
the simulated dataset
Figure 4.4: Clustering under differential privacy on simulated dataset using Laplace sani-
tizing
As expected according to Chapter 4, when trying to ensure 0.1-differential privacy,
The Laplace Post-processing method is not sufficiently precise to prevent the clustering
algorithm from failing. On the other hand PAMST by producing a more accurate approx-
imated minimum spanning tree allows DBMSTClu to present a convincing partition of
the dataset.
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Figure 4.5: Clustering under differential privacy on simulated dataset using PAMST
4.4 Discussion
This chapter presented a new way of conceiving differentially private clustering. In fact, to
our knowledge, this is the first time one can produce a MST-based clustering while ensuring
differential privacy in the process. Moreover, we theoretically motivated MST-clustering as
a good way of understanding the underlying structure of a dataset, while giving a clear proof
for Claim 4.1.1 initially stated in [XOX02]. We also produced an experimental analysis to
support the idea that private node clustering using PAMST outperforms the Laplace-based
method. As already stated in Section 3.6, one should not overlook the computational cost
of PAMST (one can refer to Section 3.6 keeping in mind that the Graph based Laplace
mechanism is almost free in terms of computational cost). Unfortunately, DBMSTClu is
also quite costly since it is a greedy algorithm. Hopefully, thanks to parallel computing, this
difficulty can be bypassed. We thus implemented DBMSTClu algorithm in R high-level
programming language, using the library foreach for a simple and efficient parallelization,
and calling our C++ implementation of PAMST using Rcpp compilation.
Finally, the analysis we gave in the last section is of course not supported only by
this experiment. One can find some additional experiments on several others simulated
datasets in Appendix A.5. One should however remark that those experiments, as well as
the one in Figures 4.4, and 4.5 are only fixed views of successful/unsuccessful clustering
tasks. A different randomization could always cause our conclusion to be gainsaid, this
is why for further work, we will focus on giving theoretical guarantees on the accuracy of
such private clustering algorithms, as well as producing more exhaustive experiments one
simulated and real-life datasets.
Conclusion
To conclude, in this report, we tackled the issue of node clustering in a graph under differ-
ential privacy constraints. This work is mostly related to differential privacy for structured
datasets, especially in the specific framework of weighted graphs, in which sensitive in-
formations are carried by the graph weights. We firstly introduced a new definition of
differential privacy on graphs closely related to a "graph sketching framework" detailed in
Section 3.3. Then, based on this new definition, we presented an algorithm for the release
of an approximated minimum spanning tree topology of a weighted graph under differen-
tial privacy constraints. This method is, to our knowledge, the first In-processing method
to produce an approximated spanning tree topology of a graph. Moreover this method
outperforms theoretically and experimentally the state of the art of the Post-processing
methods "Graph based Laplace mechanism" as soon as the graph is sufficiently dense.
The theoretical analysis we produce is also scalable and thus adaptable to other related
frameworks. Finally, we introduced a new method for nodes clustering under differential
privacy constraints. This is, to our knowledge, the first time a differentially private al-
most minimum spanning tree is used to ensure privacy in a clustering algorithm. This
new algorithm for private MST-based-clustering could pave the way to applications in
genomics, proteomics, web monitorings, under weight differential privacy. This kind of
analysis should keep good privacy while restoring the user faith in his/her security. This is
why, as a future work, we aim at finding some theoretical guarantees for the accuracy and
the robustness of our differentially clustering method. We will also continue to investigate
such methods on simulated and on real life datasets.
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Appendix A
Some additional material
A.1 Graph Theory Notations
In this report we consider any undirected-weighted graph G as split in two parts denoting its
topology G and its weight function w. The topology of a graph is composed by edge and node
sets respectively E and V , one can thus denote G = (V,E). The weight function is defined as
w ∶= E → R+ mapping any edge in E to its weight in the graph. One should also denote WE the
set of all possible weight functions mapping E to weights in R+.
Remark A.1.1. Since any weighted graph is characterize by its topology and weight function
G = (G,w) = (V,E,w), a none weighted graph reduces to its topology G = G
Now that the weighted graph is defined, let us introduce some simple definitions.
Definition A.1.1. Let G = (V,E,w) be an undirected graph. Let u, v ∈ V such that e = (u, v) ∈ E,
then e is said to be an incident edge to u and to v.
Definition A.1.2. Let G = (V,E,w) be an undirected graph. G is said to be simple if it does not
contain any graph loop (i.e. any edge having the same starting and ending node as illustrated by
figure A.1) or multiple edges (two different edges connecting the two same nodes).
Figure A.1: Classical representation of a loop and a multiple edge
For this work, every graph, even when not specified are supposed to be simple and undirected
and connected. Finally, since Chapter 3 presents a Prim-like algorithm, it might be useful for any
reader to look over this preliminary work in [Pri57], and the following definition closely linked to
this algorithm.
Definition A.1.3. Let G = (V,E,w), and some set of vertices S ⊂ V , e ∈ E is said to be xor-
incident to S if e incident to one and only one vertex in S.
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A.2 Proof of Prop 1.3.1
Recall of the proposition: A randomized algorithm A is (, δ)-differentially private if and only
if for all x, y ∈ N∣X ∣ such that x ∼ y, Dδ∞(A(x)∣∣A(y)) ≤  and Dδ∞(A(y)∣∣A(x)) ≤ .
Proof A.2.1. Let A be a randomized algorithm, and x ∼ y ∈ N∣X ∣.Ô⇒ If A is (, δ) differential private. Then ∀S ⊂ Range(A) one has
P(A(x) ∈ S) ≤ eP(A(y) ∈ S) + δ (A.1)
Since Eq. (A.1) is true regardless of the value of P(A ∈ S), it is also true when S ⊂ Supp(A) and
P(A(x) ∈ S) > δ then∀S ⊂ Supp(A) such that P(A(x) ∈ S) > δ
P(A(x) ∈ S) ≤ eP(A(y) ∈ S) + δÔ⇒ P(A(x) ∈ S) − δ ≤ eP(A(y) ∈ S)
Ô⇒ ln P(A(x) ∈ S) − δ
P(A(y) ∈ S) ≤ Ô⇒Dδ∞(A(x)∣∣A(y)) ≤ 
Symmetrically one obtains Dδ∞(A(y)∣∣A(x)) ≤ .
⇐Ô If Dδ∞(A(x)∣∣A(y)) ≤  and Dδ∞(A(y)∣∣A(x)) ≤  then ∀S ⊂ Range(A)
• If P(A(x) ∈ S) > δ and P(A(y) ∈ S) > 0 then
ln(P(A(x) ∈ S) − δ
P(A(y) ∈ S) ) ≤  Ô⇒ P(A(x) ∈ S) ≤ eP(A(y) ∈ S) + δ.
• Else if P(A(y) ∈ S) = 0 or P(A(x) ∈ S) < δ the result is immediate. ∎
A.3 Complementary proof for theorem 4.2.1
Recall of the result: Let  > 0, Y1, Y2 iid∼ Lap(1/), then fY1+Y2(x) = 4(1 + ∣x∣)e−∣x∣.
Proof A.3.1.
fY1+Y2(x) = (fY1 ∗ fY2)(x) = ∫R fY1(t)fY2(x − t)dt = ∫R ( 2)2 e−(∣t∣+∣x−t∣)dt
If x > 0 on has
fY1+Y2(x) = ( 2)2 (∫R− e2t−xdt + ∫ x0 e−xdt∫ +∞x e−2t+xdt)= ( 
2
)2 (e−x
2
+ xe−x + ex
2
e−2x)
= 
4
e−x + 2
4
xe−x. (A.2)
If x < 0 on has
fY1+Y2(x) = ( 2)2 (∫ x−∞ e2t−xdt + ∫ 0x exdt∫ +∞0 e−2t+xdt)= ( 
2
)2 (ex

− xex)
= 
4
ex − 2
4
xex. (A.3)
combining Eq. (A.2) and Eq. (A.3) one gets the result. ∎
A.4. JDSE SUBMISSION 47
Recall of the result: Let  > 0, Y1, Y2 iid∼ Lap(1/), then
∀x ≥ 0, FY1+Y2(x) = 1 − e−x (12 + x4 ) .
Proof A.3.2. Let x > 0, then
∫ x−∞ fY1+Y2(t)dt =∫ x−∞ 4 (1 + ∣t∣)e−∣t∣)dt
= 
4
⎛⎜⎝∫ 0−∞ et − tetdt
A
+ ∫ x
0
e−t + te−tdt
B
⎞⎟⎠ (A.4)
Let split A and B
A =1

[et]0−∞ − ∫ 0−∞ etdt=1

− [tet]0−∞ + ∫ 0−∞ etdt = 2 .
B = − 1

[e−t]x
0
+ ∫ x
0
te−tdt
= − 1

e−x + 1

− [tet]x
0
+ ∫ t
0
e−tdt
=2

− 2

e−x − xe−x.
It suffices to sum A and B in Eq. (A.4) to find the result. ∎
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Abstract
We investigate the problem of nodes clustering in a graph representation of a
dataset under privacy constraints. Our contribution is twofold. First we formally
define the concept of differential privacy for graphs and give an application setting
where nodes clustering under privacy constraints allows for a secure analysis of the
experiment. Then we propose a theoretically motivated method combining a sanitizing
mechanism (such as Laplace or Gaussian mechanism) with a Minimum Spanning Tree
(MST)-based clustering algorithm. It provides an accurate method for nodes clustering
in a graph while keeping the sensitive information contained in the edges weights of the
graph private. We provide some theoretical results on the robustness of the Kruskal
minimum spanning tree construction for both sanitizing mechanisms. These results
exhibit which conditions the graph’s weights should respect in order to consider that
the nodes form well separated clusters. The method has been experimentally evaluated
on simulated data, and preliminary results show the good behavior of the algorithm
while identifying well separated clusters. An extended experimental evaluation will
be presented at the conference.
Nodes clustering in a graph
under differential privacy constraints
A novel notion of differential privacy for structured datasets
Rafael PINOT *
Institut LIST, CEA, Universite´ Paris-Saclay, F-91120, Palaiseau, France
• New theoretically motivated method for clustering under differential privacy constraints using a MST-based clustering algorithm.
• Some results on the robustness of such a clustering to sanitizing by randomization.
• Conditions on the edge weights in order to consider that the nodes form well separated clusters.
Differential privacy on structured datasets
Dwork and al. in [DMNS06]: ”The outcome of any analysis is essentially equally likely, independent
of whether any individuals joins, or refrains from joining the database”.
Figure 1: Inferring the French President medical condition asking the same query on two adversarial chosen databases
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomized algorithm A with domain N∣X ∣ is called (, δ)-
differentially private if for S ⊂ Range(A) and for all x, y ∈ N∣X ∣ such that ∣∣x − y∣∣1 ≤ 1:
P[A(x) ∈ S] ≤ eP[A(y) ∈ S] + δ
Where the probability space is over the simplex ofA. Moreover, if δ = 0,A is said to be -differentially
private.
Definition 2 (`p sensitivity). For any p ∈ N, and f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk, the `p sensitivity of f is:
∆pf ∶= max
x,y∈N∣X ∣,x∼y ∣∣f(x) − f(y)∣∣p
i.e the maximum `p-distance between the outcomes of any two neighboring databases.
Definition 3 (Laplace Mechanism). Given any function f ∶ N∣X ∣ → Rk, and  > 0, the Laplace mecha-
nism is defined as ML(x, f, ) = f(x) + (Y1, ..., Yk)
where Yi are i.i.d. random variables drawn from Lap(∆1f/).
Adam Sealfon in [Sea16]: In transport networks, genes correlation maps, world wide web monitor-
ing, etc, the information is carried by the edge weights, this is why they must be protected.
Proposition 1 (e.g [DR13] Post-Processing). Let A ∶ D → R be a randomized algorithm that is (, δ)-
differentially private, and h ∶ R → R′ a deterministic mapping. Then h ○ A is (, δ)-differentially
private.
Figure 2: An almost minimum spanning tree under differential privacy conditions by post-processing a Laplace mechanism
New private MST-based nodes clustering
Xu and al. / Zhou and al. / Morvan and al. [YVD02, YOT11, MCGA17]: Minimum spanning tree
based clustering algorithms help recognizing clusters with arbitrary shapes and thus can be used for
wider applications than community detection.
Our contribution:
• Reformulation and proof of theoretical motivation for MST-based clustering
• MST-based clustering algorithm using a differentially private almost minimum spanning tree.
Definition 4 (Sepearability condition of a cluster). Let G = (V,E,w) a simple weighted graph, (V, d)
a metric space defined in G according to the minimal-weighted path between nodes, and D ⊂ V a
dataset. C ⊂D is called a cluster if and only if for any partition C = C1 ⊍C2 one has
arg min
v∈D−C1 {min{d(v, c)∣c ∈ C1}} ∈ C2.
Figure 3: Illustration of a minimum spanning tree based clustering
Proposition 2 (Reformulation of [YVD02]). If one takes two points c1, c2 of a cluster C, then all data
points in the tree path connecting c1 and c2 in the MST must be in C.
Proposition 3. Let G = (V,E,w) be an undirected weighted graph, if one constructs K > 1 sets of
edges (E1, ...,EK) such that:
i, j ∈ [K], i < j Ô⇒ ∀e ∈ Ei, e′ ∈ Ej,w(e) < w(e′) (1)
Then Eq. 1 holds on G′ =MGbL(G, ) with probability greater than
1 − ∑
i∈[K−1] exp(−ti,i+1) (12 + ti,i+14 ) (Ei +Ei+1 − 1) With ti,i+1 = mine∈Ei,e′∈Ei+1{w(e′) −w(e)}.
Figure 4: Experiment investigating the robustness of MSDR to privacy mechanisms and simple heuristic
Future Work
• Find new ways for releasing an almost minimum spanning tree under
differential privacy constraints.
• Investigate gene clustering using genes map interaction graphs.
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A.5 Additional Simulations
Figure A.2: Simple visualization of the -graph based on the euclidean matrix distance of
the simulated dataset 1
Figure A.3: Clustering under differential privacy on dataset 1 using Laplace sanitizing
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Figure A.4: Clustering under differential privacy on dataset 1 using PAMST
Figure A.5: Simple visualization of the -graph based on the euclidean matrix distance of
the dataset 2
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Figure A.6: Clustering under differential privacy on dataset 2 using Laplace sanitizing
Figure A.7: Clustering under differential privacy on dataset 2 using PAMST
